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NOTES
JURISDICTION UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT:
THE "INTERSTATE COMMERCE"
ELEMENT AND THE ACTIVITIES
OF LOCAL REAL ESTATE
BOARDS AND BROKERS
Membership in a local board is perhaps the most important affilia-
tion a real estate broker can have, since it affords members substantial
competitive advantages over nonmembers.' However, the activities of
local real estate boards, like other professional and trade associations,
are often subject to challenge under the Sherman Act' as being unrea-
sonably anticompetitive. In particular, such challenges usually involve
either price fixing or exclusion from board membership As with any
other Sherman Act complaint, the first problem to be addressed is
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 1325 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Austin];
Graybeal, Antitrust Violations in RealEstate Transactions, 60 ILL. B.J. 856 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Graybeal];
Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman
cl-.4 Look at the Development and Future of the Currently Employed Jurisdictional Tests, 21
VILL. L. REv. 721 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Confusing World].
I. Graybeal 857. Chief among these advantages is participation in the board-run "Multiple
Listing Service" (MLS). The MLS substantially expands the size of the market in which a broker
can operate. Id. The system functions by requiring member brokers to pool their exclusive list-
ings, allowing each member broker complete freedom to sell property listed by other members.
See B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME 112 (1978); Austin 1328-30. The
advantage to such a service is obvious. Each broker acquires a virtual "catalogue" of properties
over which his customers may browse. As evidence of the huge inventory of property an MLS
broker is likely to have, a study done in California indicated that over 80% of all residential
purchases involved an MLS member. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing andEfficiency
in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 948 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
§ I.
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a felony .... " Id. § 2.
3. Graybeal 857. There is at least some debate as to whether antitrust enforcement in these
cases is beneficial or not. Compare Owen, supra note 1, at 956 (lack of competition among mem-
ber brokers is the cause of excessively high prices for brokerage services) with Barasch, HowAnti-
trust .4ctions Have Affected Real Estate Brokers' Commissions, 3 REAL EsT. L.J. 227, 228 (1975)
(the threat or institution of lawsuits to enjoin use of fee schedules has increased commission rates).
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whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Act.4
There are two jurisdictional prerequisites under the Sherman Act.
First, some form of "trade" must be involved. Second, the alleged re-
straint must be interstate.' That the first requirement is satisfied where
real estate activities are involved can no longer be seriously question-
ed.6 This Note will concern itself with the latter requirement.
The Sherman Act was passed pursuant to Congress' commerce
power,8 and as the judicial construction of that power has expanded in
this century, so has the reach of the Act.9 However, while it is often
stated that Congress exerted its "utmost power" under the commerce
clause in passing the Sherman Act,"0 the courts have uniformly refused
to give the Sherman Act the kind of broad and sweeping interpretation
accorded other commerce clause statutes." In fact, this disparity in
treatment is not without justification. Under other pieces of commerce
clause legislation, Congress had already made the factual determina-
tion that particular types of conduct adversely affected interstate com-
merce. With the Sherman Act, Congress left to the judiciary the
determination of what factual situations would invoke the proscriptions
4. Of course, federal law is not the only possible antitrust remedy. Many states provide
their own "little Sherman Acts." However, state enforcement may be, for one reason or another,
unavailable or undesirable. For example, due to the political power of local boards, states may
ignore antitrust violations on the part of real estate brokers. Austin 1336.
5. See Austin 1331.
6. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); Austin
1331-32.
7. Some analysts have summarily concluded that jurisdiction under the Act is "clearly met"
with regard to the activities of local boards. Graybeal 857. A quick glance at the case law, how-
ever, demonstrates that the courts have not found the issue quite so easy to resolve.
8. "The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CO'sT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 950 (1973).
"It is now clear that the federal commerce power is as broad as the need that evokes it and
encompasses not only the regulation of interstate commerce itself, but all measures necessary and
proper to that end including purely intrastate activities, if necessary, to protect and foster inter-
state commerce." Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817, 828 (w.D. Pa. 1975), aJ'd, 544 F.2d
1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
10. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)). See also Rasmussen v. American
Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Pacific Seafarers,
Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969);
Confusing World 726.
11. Note, Portrait of the Sherman 4ct as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323,
325 (1974); see Furgeson, The Commerce Testfor Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L.
REV. 1052, 1053 (1975).
For examples of the broad application given other commerce clause statutes, see, e.g., Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
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of the Act.12 It is, therefore, up to the courts to decide, in the first in-
stance, whether the facts permit the exercise of jurisdiction under the
commerce clause.13
This Note will discuss first the traditional tests of Sherman Act
jurisdiction, particularly in light of the landmark decision of the
Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.'4 After examining
the case-by-case application of each test to real estate brokerage and
local board activities, the Note will conclude that Sherman Act juris-
diction should be sustained in most cases involving charges of either
price fixing or unreasonable exclusion from board membership.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TRADITIONAL TESTS FOR SHERMAN ACT
JURISDICTION
A. "Zn Commerce" versus 'Affecting Commerce."
The courts have developed two major standards to determine
whether the requisite nexus exists between the complained-of activity
and interstate commerce: the in commerce and the affecting commerce
tests.'" Under the in commerce test, the court is required to find that
the alleged restraint of trade occurred within the flow of interstate com-
merce.' 6 The affecting commerce test requires that the complained-of
activity, though wholly intrastate in nature, be found to have affected
interstate commerce substantially.' 7
12. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 950 (1973). Where Congress has made such a determination, only a rational basis for the
finding is necessary to support it. 472 F.2d at 524. See generally J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1978).
13. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d at 524.
14. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15. A plaintiff may rely on either test to sustain jurisdiction. The modem statement of these
tests first appeared in Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 n.3
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); see Eiger, The Commerce Element in FederalAntirust
Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282, 286 (1965); Confusing World 728.
16. This is the narrower of the two tests, since the "flow of commerce" notion has been rather
restrictively interpreted by the courts. See Eiger, supra note 15, at 287.
17. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d at 739.
In application, it is often unclear just which standard is being employed. See text accompa-
nying notes 44-61 infra. Indeed, it has been suggested that there is no historical basis or need for
requiring two alternative grounds for establishing the interstate commerce element under the
Sherman Act:
The entire distinction between an "in" commerce and "affect" commerce situation is
apparently dependent upon when the interstate journey begins and ceases. A violation
which occurs before the interstate [movement] begins or after it has halted is covered by
the Act only if it "affects" commerce. But, by stretching the length of the interstate
movement, one can bring an "affect" transaction on either end of the journey into the
flow of commerce as an "in" commerce offense. Thus, the distinction depends not upon
the locale of the violation, but upon how far the court is willing to expand the conceptual
entity known as the flow of commerce.
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Under both the in commerce and the affecting commerce tests, it is
necessary to show some adverse impact on interstate commerce.
18
Thus, a two-step approach should be utilized in analyzing jurisdiction
under either test. The conduct complained of should first be character-
ized as either in or affecting commerce. Second, the analysis should
address the adverseness of the alleged impact. The test for demonstrat-
ing this adverseness is qualitative. Once the nature of the impact is
shown to be detrimental to commerce, the adverseness requirement is
met regardless of the amount of interstate commerce the complained-of
conduct actually involved.' 9
Characterization of conduct as "in commerce" and a qualitative
finding of adverseness are sufficient to establish Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion under the in commerce test. However, an additional finding is re-
quired for conduct characterized as merely "affecting commerce." In
that situation, the substantiality of the conduct must also be judged
quantitativey. That is, the court must initially find that a substantial
amount of interstate commerce is affected by the admittedly intrastate
activity;2" the court then will make a determination as to the qualitative
impact or effect of the acts.
One may logically question whether there is any practical distinc-
tion between the two tests.2" The difference between an in commerce
and an affecting commerce categorization, however, may be crucial in
some cases, especially those involving so called per se violations of the
antitrust laws. If a per se violation, like price fixing, is alleged, an ad-
verse effect upon commerce will be presumed as a matter of law.' 2 If
this violation can be said to have occurred within the flow of interstate
commerce, the plaintitf 3 need go no further in carrying his jurisdic-
Eiger, supra note 15, at 286-87. The author goes on to state that if the Las Vegas dichotomy has
any validity, it is in those cases in which the object of the violation has never moved in interstate
commerce, but the impact of the violation affects the flow of commerce in another related product.
These would be the only true "affect" situations. Id. 287. Whatever the historical justification, it
is clear that the overwhelming majority of courts continue to utilize this dual approach to jurisdic-
tion.
18. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d at 739 n.3.
A plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act simply by demonstrating that
the acts complained of affect a business that is engaged in interstate commerce. Rather, the plain-
tiff must show that the complained-of conduct adversely affects the interstate commerce of that
business. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
19. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d at 739 n.3.
20. See text accompanying notes 31-35 & 120-23 infra.
21. See note 17 supra.
22. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d at 748 n.9; see, e.g., Ev-
ans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1190-93 (3d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
23. The term "plaintiff" as used here is interchangeable with "government" where the Justice
Department has initiated the action. The interstate commerce element ofjurisdiction is applicable
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tional burden.2 4 However, if the complained-of activity is purely local
in nature and merely affects interstate commerce, the plaintiff will first
be required to demonstrate that the conduct affects a substantial
amount of interstate commerce.
The case of Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Association P. United
States26 illustrates this distinction. The government argued that price
fixing at any level of commerce necessarily had a substantial adverse
impact on interstate commerce, and that the law presumed such an im-
pact. In response to the argument, the court stated:
Assuming an "in commerce" situation, we can agree. But when
the "affect" on commerce theory is presented, it is clearly a question
of fact whether wholly intrastate activities affect interstate commerce
in a manner proscribed by the Sherman Act. After this question is
decided, then the per se doctrine may well apply.27
The court went on to point out that, under the in commerce theory, the
question of "substantiality" need not even be presented to the jury.28
This method of analysis applies as well to violations that do not
fall under a per se rule. If the plaintiff is relying on the affecting com-
merce standard, he first must answer the threshold question of whether
the complained-of conduct has substantially affected interstate com-
merce.2 9 Only then can he address himself to the adverseness of that
effect.3°
Determining just how much interstate commerce must be affected
before the effect can be deemed substantial is likely to be a critical
point of inquiry under the affecting commerce test.31 Some courts and
in either case. See, e.g., United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc., [1977-21 Trade Cas. 161,679, at
72,786-87 (D.C. Md.).
24. "If a per se violation is involved and if the restraint does occur within the flow of inter-
state commerce, then the test is qualitative . . . and there need be no evidentiary showing of a
substantial effect. . . ." Cook v. Ralston Purina Co., 366 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (M.D. Ga. 1973)
(emphasis in original).
25. But see Austin 1335.
26. 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
27. 210 F.2d at 748.
28. Id.
29. "The per se doctrine only establishes the unreasonable nature of the restraint; it does not
establish that the restraint has substantial interstate impact." Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F.
Supp. 817, 829 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afI'd, 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977).
30. Once it is shown that wholly intrastate activities substantially affect the flow of interstate
commerce, the court then determines whether that impact is adverse by applying the same analysis
as that used under the in commerce test. Similarly, the test is "qualitative"; once any detrimental
effect is shown, it is unnecessary to show the degree of harm involved. See text accompanying
note 19 supra.
3 1. The question of substantiality as it relates to real estate brokerage activities will be dis-
cussed in detail later in this Note. See text accompanying notes 120-23 infra. It may be helpful,
however, to point out here that an "effect can be 'substantial' under the Sherman Act even if its
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commentators have asserted that the quantity of interstate commerce
affected is irrelevant in demonstrating the substantiality of the impact
of purely local activities on interstate commerce. 32 Much of the case
law, however, emphasizes the importance of cumulating the amounts of
commerce involved when the affecting commerce doctrine is utilized.33
Indeed, if a qualitative test is employed to demonstrate the substantial-
ity of an effect, it is difficult to understand why courts continue to dis-
tinguish between the in commerce and affecting commerce tests. Ih
would appear in such a case, for example, that any per se offense would
violate the Sherman Act, no matter how local the scope of the activity
involved.34 Few courts would be willing to go that far.
Under either test, the courts disregard the distinction between con-
duct that is "purposely directed" toward interstate commerce and con-
duct that only "indirectly" affects such commerce.36 If the defendant's
conduct has an impact upon interstate commerce in a manner pro-
scribed by the Sherman Act, jurisdiction will be upheld, whether that
impact was by design or not.
37
A particularly perplexing issue is presented in determining at what
point during the litigation the courts should apply the jurisdictional
tests. The Sherman Act refers to monopolies and restraints of trade
"among the several states."' 38 This language both sets the jurisdictional
range of the statute and defines the prohibited conduct. 39 Since a bur-
den on interstate commerce is a prerequisite for jurisdiction and an
element of the substantive offense, the usually preliminary question of
subject matter jurisdiction becomes intermingled with questions on the
merits. Some courts have stated that if the complained-of activities
might have a detrimental effect on interstate commerce (and either the
in commerce or affecting commerce standard is otherwise satisfied), the
court will accept jurisdiction.4" This approach, however, has been
impact on interstate commerce falls far short of causing enterprises to fold or affecting market
price." Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745 (1976).
32. See Austin 1334 and citations listed therein.
33. See, e.g., Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1188-90 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 908 (1977); see text accompanying notes 54-59 & 120-23 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
35. But see Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, [1978-1] Trade Cas. 1 62,078, at 74,684 (10th
Cir. 1977) ("We observe that a price-fixing conspiracy is violative of § I of the Sherman Act
whether the activity is interstate or intrastate ... ").
36. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. at 744.
37. Contra, Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952) (re-
straint must be "direct" and not "merely incidental").
38. See note 2 supra.
39. Confusing World 724.
40. See, e.g., A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484
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much criticized.4' One court has stated, "[i]t is the rule that in pleading
the requisite anticompetitive effect in a federal antitrust suit, there must
be some allegation of ultimate facts sufficient to show restraint on inter-
state commerce."42 The latter position is more in line with traditional
views of the primacy of a court's power to adjudicate.43
B. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: A Fundamental Change in the
Jurisdictional Tests?
The Supreme Court's opinion in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' is
subject to at least three different interpretations. The Court could have
been applying one of the two traditional jurisdictional tests, or it may
have adopted "a more ad hoc approach, combining elements from both
standards in reviewing the findings of the trial court."45 Clearly, the
Court in Goldfarb did not identify the jurisdictional theory being em-
ployed. Yet, it appears unlikely that the Court's decision marked any
significant departure from the traditional jurisdictional tests.
In Goldfarb, the issue was whether the Fairfax County Bar Associ-
ation's minimum fee schedule for real estate title examinations46 vio-
lated section one of the Sherman Act. Defendants argued that their
activities were wholly local and had no substantial effect on interstate
commerce. The Court accepted jurisdiction on the ground that the title
searches were an "integral part" of a larger interstate transaction, that
of financing local home purchases. 47 As evidence of the interstate na-
ture of real estate financing, the Court pointed out that "significant por-
tions" of funds for purchases of homes in Fairfax County came from
other states, and that many loans on these homes were guaranteed by
the Veterans Administration or the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.48
F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); Gateway Assoc. v. Essex-Costello,
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
41. "The law of this Circuit now seems to require the district courts to try antitrust cases on
the merits before they may determine whether they even have the jurisdiction or power to do so.
Obviously, this makes little sense and adds to the burgeoning caseload of the district courts."
Gateway Assoc. v. Essex-Costello, Inc., 380 F. Supp. at 1094.
42. Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, [1978-I] Trade Cas. 62,078, at 74,684 (10th Cir.
1977).
43. "The jurisdiction of a court can never depend upon its decision upon the merits of a case
brought before it, but upon its right to hear and determine it at all." I W. BAILEY, THE LAW OF
JURISDICTION 2 (1899).
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. Confusing World 742.
46. According to Virginia law, the title exams could be performed only by members of the
Virginia State Bar. 421 U.S. at 775.
47. Id. at 784.
48. Id. at 783.
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Goidfarb can be interpreted as an in commerce case, holding that
Virginia lawyers provided services in the flow of commerce. Such an
interpretation may seem conceptually awkward, since services are in-
tangible and the tendency is to think only in terms of "goods" moving
in commerce.49 However, there is nothing innovative in the notion that
intangibles like services are capable of moving and being restrained in
the flow of interstate commerce.50 In Associated Press v. United
States,51 for example, it was successfully argued that the interstate
movement of "news" had been restrained as a result of the defendant's
anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, in its antitrust complaints against
state bar associations, the Justice Department has adopted the view that
the services of lawyers are in interstate commerce. 2
The Goldfarb decision is also susceptible to an affecting commerce
interpretation. This analysis places heavy stress on the Court's state-
ments that the title searches performed by attorneys were "an integral
part" of an underlying interstate transaction.5 3 Thus, the legal services
could be viewed as entirely intrastate, but with substantial impact upon
interstate commerce.
One commentator has declared that under an affecting commerce
interpretation, "the requirement of a proven substantial quantitative ef-
fect . . . is no longer significant. . . .After Goldfarb, interstate com-
merce need scarcely feel the 'pinch' to trigger jurisdiction. 54 This
argument may confuse the requirement that the complained-of activi-
ties affect a substantial amount of interstate commerce with the further
requirement that the local activities be shown to have had an adverse
effect on commerce.5 The test for the latter requirement is qualita-
tive,56 and was satisfied in Goldfarb by the mere fact that the alleged
49. Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 1164, 1181.
50. See Austin 1334 n.62 and citations therein.
51. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
52. See Comment, supra note 49, at 1182-83, where the author refers to one such complaint
filed against the Oregon State Bar in which the Justice Department urged that the activities of the
bar and its members were "within the flow of interstate commerce." The author goes on to say,
however, that "the assumption that legal services are not in the flow of commerce is probably a
sound one." Id. 1182.
53. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
54. Note, The Shifting Jurisdiction of the Antitrust Laws, 33 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 181, 192
(1976) (emphasis in original). The author was obviously referring to the often quoted remark
from United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949): "If it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze." Id. at 464.
55. See text accompanying notes 22-35 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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misconduct was price fixing, a per se violation.5 7 The Court had al-
ready gone through the analysis of finding a substantial quantitative
impact on interstate commerce. The presence of "significant portions"
of out-of-state mortgage funds and federal loan guarantees,5 8 along
with the "substantial volume of commerce involved,"59 had satisfied
this quantitative test.
A third possible interpretation of Goldfarb suggests that the show-
ing of an adverse effect on commerce arising from the alleged miscon-
duct is no longer required. "[I]f Goldfarb is considered an 'affecting
commerce' case, the Court has apparently decided to define the words
'affecting commerce' to mean 'have a connection with commerce.'
Under this interpretation, the only allegation required. . . would be a
connection with a substantial amount of interstate commerce."6 While
the Court may have intended to abolish the "adverse impact" require-
ment, it is difficult to see how Goldfarb can be cited in support of such a
proposition, since, as already stated, Goldfarb involved a per se viola-
tion in which the adverse effect would be presumed.6'
Thus, though the Supreme Court may have been somewhat lenient
in applying the traditional tests to the factual setting in Goldfarb, it was
not necessarily ignoring the tests altogether or even significantly alter-
ing them. The remainder of this Note is based on the assumption that
the Goldfarb decision left the existing jurisdictional standards relatively
intact.
II. THE ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL BOARDS UNDER THE "IN
COMMERCE" THEORY
Courts have traditionally viewed real estate brokerage as a purely
local activity.62 This view was supported by the propositions that land
is an immobile resource that restricts the range of the broker's activi-
ties, that brokers are licensed under state laws to perform only intra-
state services, and that the real estate sale itself must be consummated
according to the law of the situs of the property.63 These arguments
can be countered with the assertion that real estate brokers do not sell
57. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 782-83 (1975) (the Court stressed this was a
"classic illustration of price fixing"). See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
58. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
59. 421 U.S. at 785.
60. Confusing World 744 (footnote omitted).
61. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
62. As one court pointed out in 1964, no case could be cited at that time holding that dealing
in real estate was commerce among the states. Cotillion Club, Inc. v. Detroit Real Estate Bd., 303
F. Supp. 850, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
63. Austin 1332. "Real property is itself the quintessential local product." McLain v. Real
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"real estate" as such-rather, they sell a service that "utilizes interstate
media and facilitates interstate movement. 64
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar65 has caused a number of courts to reevaluate the traditional
position of real estate brokerage under the in commerce theory of Sher-
man Act jurisdiction.66 Given the significant interstate aspects of mod-
em real estate brokerage, this reevaluation is justified.
Certainly, the Court in Goldfarb never indicated expressly that
real estate brokerage activities are within the flow of commerce, though
it did make reference to the "interstate aspects of real estate transac-
tions. '67 Instead, the thrust of the Court's holding was that real estate
financing is interstate in nature.68 Nonetheless, some courts appear to
have read Goldfarb as implying that real estate brokerage is in inter-
state commerce.69
In Diversified Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Board
of Realtors,7 ° plaintiffs claimed that their unreasonable exclusion from
membership in the local board was a violation of the Sherman Act.
They based their case entirely on the assertion that the board's activi-
ties were in interstate commerce, and presented no evidence that the
defendant's activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but was careful to point
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315, 1319 (5th Cir. 1978), cerl. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2159
(1979).
64. Graybeal 858.
65. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra for a discussion of the
Goldfarb jurisdictional test.
66. Note that at least one pre-Goldfarb case can be cited in which a federal court held real
estate brokerage activities to be within the flow of interstate commerce. In Mazur v. Behrens,
[1974-1] Trade Cas. 75,070, at 96,787 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court ruled that members of a local
board had "voluntarily entered interstate commerce and are subject to the laws governing such
activities." Id. at 96,788. The court cited as evidence of the interstate nature of the defendants'
business activities the fact that 40% or more of the sales of some defendants were to out-of-staters,
and many defendants advertised and solicited customers outside Illinois. Id. (the plaintiffs were
relying upon the per se rule to establish the requisite detrimental effect on interstate commerce; see
text accompanying notes 22-28 supra).
67. 421 U.S. at 785.
68. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. The real estate broker's primary function is to
place buyer and seller in contact with one another in an effort to consummate a sale. Thus, the
actual financing of the purchase may be considered outside the broker's responsibility. However,
brokers often serve as essential informational and referral conduits to lenders.
69. These courts appear to have analogized the position of the lawyers in Goldfarb to that of
real estate brokers. Brokerage may also be an "integral part" of an interstate transaction. How-
ever, that still does not mean that real estate brokerage is necessarily in commerce. Under this
analogy, Goldfarb may stand for the proposition that brokerage merely affects an interstate trans-
action. One can speculate, however, that Goldfarb's reference to an "integral part" of an interstate
transaction was an application of the "flow of commerce" standard.
70. 521 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1975).
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out the "limited nature" of its holding.7 It stressed that the plaintiffs'
only evidence as to the interstate character of the board's services con-
sisted of a showing that five out-of-state persons (out of a survey of
sixteen percent' of the board's listings over a three-year period) bought
property through the board's Multiple Listing Service (MLS).72 The
court then stated:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs offered no evidence such as that in
Goldfarb that a "significant portion" (or indeed any) of the funds
underlying these real estate transactions came from outside Iowa.
Whereas in Goldfarb the federal government had guaranteed many
of the loans made in Virginia, the plaintiffs in this case produced no
evidence showing any guarantee of these loans by an out-of-state
agency. Furthermore, plaintiffs introduced no evidence of any other
interstate commercial aspect to these transactions, such as interstate
advertising.73
The court concluded with the statement that brokerage services might,
depending upon the evidence presented, constitute interstate activi-
ties.74
The court in Oglesby & Barclif, Inc. v. Metro MLS, Inc. 75 also ar-
guably read Goldfarb as indicating that real estate brokerage is an in-
terstate activity. It is not clear, however, whether the Oglesby court was
citing Goldfarb for its in commerce or for its affecting commerce impli-
cations. The court stated that the business of the MLS, which was run
by the local board, "clearly involved interstate commerce. ' 76 The court
then went on to cite the factors that were instrumental in the finding of
this interstate "involvement." Among these were the Goldfarb factors
concerning federally insured loans and out-of-state mortgage funding,
along with evidence of interstate advertising, membership in national
referral organizations, 77 and sales to a "substantial number" of out-of-
staters.7 s Whether or not the court was relying on Gold/arb to support
its finding, it is clear that the court felt the activities of the MLS and its
members "were within the flow of interstate commerce and had a sub-
71. Id. at 1347.
72. Id. at 1345. See note I supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the functioning
of the MLS.
73. 521 F.2d at 1346-47 (emphasis in original). Note that the same kind of evidence that a
plaintiff would rely on to demonstrate a "substantial effect" on commerce was cited by this court
as evidence under the "in commerce" test.
74. Id. at 1347.
75. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 1 61,064, at 69,795 (E.D. Va.).
76. Id. at 69,797 (emphasis added).
77. See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the functioning of na-
tional referral systems.
78. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 1 61,064, at 69,797 (E.D. Va.).
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stantial effect upon interstate commerce."
79
On the other hand, some courts have steadfastly refused to read
Goldfarb as indicating that real estate brokerage is an interstate trans-
action.80 The district court in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Or-
leans, Inc. l rejected the arguments that national relocation service
activities and interstate financing of home purchases either place real
estate brokerage in interstate commerce or substantially affect such
conmerce.82 It distinguished the holding in Goldfarb by asserting that
"the actual financing process involves only the lender and borrower
and the brokerage service is in no way an integral aspect thereof."
' 3
On balance, the sounder view is that real estate brokerage is an
interstate activity, at least where brokers engage in sales to nonresi-
dents, secure FHA-VA loans for their customers, advertise nationally,
and participate in national referral systems.84 National advertising and
referral system activities, in particular, should inject local real estate
brokers into the flow of interstate commerce. It is patently unreasona-
ble for a local broker to solicit business nationwide and then complain
because his activities have been subjected to regulation under the com-
merce power. National referral systems operate by allowing a local
broker to participate in the sale of real property hundreds or thousands
79. Id.
80. See Note, supra note 54, at 188-89, where the author states that Goidfarb made the affect-
ing commerce doctrine applicable to "the entire real estate purchase." See also Comment, supra
note 49, at 1182, where the author asserts that Goldfarb probably did not stand for the notion that
legal services are in commerce. (The analogy between the positions of attorneys and real estate
brokers is discussed in the text accompanying notes 109-10 infra and at note 69 supra.)
81. 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed, 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 2159 (1979). Plaintiffs in McLain alleged that board members had conspired to
fix prices, a per se violation.
82. 432 F. Supp. at 983 n.3. See text accompanying notes 114-19 infra for a discussion of
McLain and the affecting commerce doctrine.
83. 432 F. Supp. at 984. The court found practically no significance in the national relocation
service affiliations of member brokers. Id. at 983 n.3.
The court in United States v. Greater Syracuse Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 887, 897
(N.D.N.Y. 1978), directly challenged the holding in McLain, although it declined to discuss the
price-fixing allegations under the in commerce theory, having already established jurisdiction
under the affecting commerce standard. The court clearly implied, nonetheless, that a good case
could be made for the assertion that brokerage activities are in interstate commerce. (For exam-
ple, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Goidfarb had "regarded the underlying
real estate transactions as being frequently interstate in nature." Id. at 891.) Interestingly, the
Justice Department in Syracuse made no allegations of any interstate advertising or financing
activities. Id. at 897-98. The lack of these factors may have prompted the court to rely on the
affecting commerce theory alone.
For a critique of the McLain court's analysis of the broker's role in the financing process see
text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
84. These factors will usually be available to a plaintiff who wishes to allege that sales by
members of a local board are in commerce. Graybeal 858.
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of miles away. This is accomplished by having one broker refer a client
who is moving out-of-state to a broker in the destination area. The
destination broker consummates the sale, but the referring broker
shares in the commission. 85 These relocation or referral systems are
often as farflung nationally as the most successful fast food chain.8 6 It
seems ridiculous to deny their interstate character.
Further, the approach taken by the McLain court, attempting to
separate the broker's function in bringing the buyer and seller together
from his function as an informational source for his clients on financing
and related matters, serves only to ignore the broker's full role in the
purchasing process. "Because brokers are the primary contact with the
real estate market for most home buyers, their clients often rely on
them to provide other information about the home buying process. 87
The broker is often responsible for referring purchasers to particular
lenders. His role in the sales transaction is not essentially complete un-
til the purchaser closes his loan and the broker receives his commission
check.8
One authority has summed up the whole in commerce dilemma as
it relates to real estate brokerage as follows:
The issue involves an interesting dichotomy. The object of the
transaction, the land itself, is clearly within intrastate commerce; yet
the transaction by which the interest in the object is conveyed clearly
has interstate dimensions .... Focusing on the transaction rather
than its object is more consistent with expanded Sherman Act appli-
cability and such an approach has in fact been the basis of the gov-
ernment's complaints filed against the various real estate boards.89
The trend in favor of finding real estate boards subject to the Sher-
man Act under either of the traditional jurisdictional theories is per-
haps best exemplified by the large number of consent decrees entered
in these cases.90 Indeed, it has been stated that it "has almost [been]
85. See United States v. Greater Syracuse Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 887, 895
(N.D.N.Y. 1978) for a discussion of the mechanics and significance of these relocation systems.
86. REVIEW, November 1978, at 24 (advertisement stating that a "nationwide computerized
relocation service" has "1100 coast to coast offices").
87. Owen, supra note I, at 944.
88. Contra, McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 432 F. Supp. at 985. It should
be noted that on appeal the Fifth Circuit did take notice of the broker's "informational" role in
the financing process, although it accepted the district court's characterization of this role as
merely "incidental" to interstate commerce. 583 F.2d at 1322-23.
89. Dunfee, Sherman Act Applicability to Real Estate Boards, 10 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 142
(1972).
90. See, e.g., United States v. MLS, [1972] Trade Cas. 74,221 (D. Ore.); United States v.
Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc., [1972] Trade Cas. 74,068 (E.D.N.Y.); United States v. Cleve-
land Real Estate Bd., [1972] Trade Cas. 74,020 (N.D. Ohio); United States v. Atlanta Real Estate
Bd., [1972] Trade Cas. 73,787 (N.D. Ga.); United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Real-
tors, Inc., [19711 Trade Cas. T 73,393 (D. Md. 1970).
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established through consent decrees that the activities of real estate
boards are in commerce or trade and that these activities are substan-
tial . . . 91
Despite such broad pronouncements, a mere finding that the com-
plained-of conduct occurred in commerce will not alone sustain juris-
diction. The plaintiff must still demonstrate that the defendant's
activities adversely affected interstate commerce. 92 A court may reject
Sherman Act jurisdiction on this latter ground whether or not it admits
the interstate nature of the activities involved.93
Cotillion Club, Inc. v. Detroit Real Estate Board94 dealt with alle-
gations that the defendant brokers had conspired to exclude Negro bro-
kers from membership in the local board and to segregate
neighborhoods by race. As evidence of the interstate nature of the de-
fendant's conduct, the plaintiffs pointed out that members of the board
had made sales to purchasers obtaining FHA and VA loans, that the
members had filed the necessary forms with federal agencies to secure
these loans, and that members had made sales to out-of-state buyers.
Although the court indicated that a number of defects were present in
the plaintiffs' complaint, the principal difficulty appeared to be that no
adverse effect was demonstrated. "The critical question is whether the
alleged restraints are operative in interstate commerce, and not whether
the defendants' members engage, in the oVerall conduct of their busi-
ness, in incidental activities across state lines." 95
It will often be difficult to establish a connection between the de-
fendant's activities and some injury to interstate commerce, especially
where no per se violation has been alleged. However, the reasoning of
91. Epley & Parsons, Real Estate Transactions and the Sherman Act: How to Approach an
Antitrust Suit, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 6 (1976).
92. See note 18 supra and text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. The consent decrees cited in
note 90 supra all involved price-fixing allegations, thereby obviating any need to make a showing
of adverseness. Complaints brought against local boards by the Justice Department almost always
attack rate fixing. Private plaintiffs, on the other hand, usually claim unreasonable exclusion from
board membership. Graybeal 858-59.
See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra for a discussion of price fixing allegations and the
adverseness requirement.
93. See, e.g., Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, [1978-1] Trade Cas.
1 62,079 (10th Cir.); Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, [1978-1] Trade Cas. 62,078 (10th Cir.
1977); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2159 (1979); Marston v. Ann
Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Mich. 1969), a#'d, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.
1970).
94. 303 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
95. Id. at 853. However, even if the plaintiff had been able to demonstrate a connection
between the alleged activities of the brokers and some harm to interstate commerce, the court was
unwilling to consider the brokers' activities in commerce. The court felt that "except for inciden-
tals, the activities are local and intrastate." Id. at 854.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the court in Cotillion Club that no such connection existed may have
little present significance, at least with regard to the charges that the
defendant brokers had conspired to segregate housing patterns by race.
The congressional determination that racial segregation in the distribu-
tion of services to the public has a detrimental impact on interstate
commerce has become clear since the Cotillion Club decision was
handed down.96 Though the court is the factflnder in determining
whether interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected for Sherman
Act purposes,9 7 there appears to be no valid reason for ignoring the
very strong expression of congressional purpose contained in other
commerce clause legislation.98
The court in Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors99 followed the
Cotillion Club analysis. In Bryan, the plaintiff had also been excluded
from membership in the board, though not for any racially motivated
reason. He cited the same factors concerning the board's interstate ac-
tivities that other Sherman Act plaintiffs have relied upon in these
cases. The court sustained a dismissal for lack of subject matter juris-
diction on the grounds that "nothing contained in Bryan's complaint
does other than indicate that the acts complained of affect a business
engaged in interstate commerce." 00 The court indicated that had price
fixing been alleged it would have upheld jurisdiction.' 0 '
The Bryan case was relied upon in the most recent Sherman Act
case involving brokerage activities, Income Realty & Mortgage v. Den-
ver Board of Realtors.t02 The plaintiff's complaint accused board
members of trying to undermine his real estate business. The plaintiffs
evidence relating to the interstate nature of the defendant's conduct
was limited to the conclusory statement that they were "engaged in the
interstate brokerage of real estate."'0 3 However, the trial court dis-
96. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
97. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
98. Indeed, the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976), is itself a possible remedy for
exclusion from board membership on account of race. Austin 1330 n.41.
99. [1978-1] Trade Cas. 62,078, at 74,681 (10th Cir. 1977).
100, Id. at 74,686.
101. Id. at 74,684.
The Bryan case is especially interesting for its unusual interpretation of Goldfarb. The court
stated:
We observe that a price-fixing conspiracy is violative of § I of the Sherman Act
,vhether the activity is interstate or intrastate in character. Significantly, in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar the Supreme Court held that § I of the Sherman Act was violated by
the strictly intrastate activity of the State Bar. . .because it constituted a classic exam-
ple of price fixing.
Id. at 74,684 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
102. [1978-1] Trade Cas. 62,079, at 74,686 (10th Cir.).
103. Id. at 74,688 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
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missed the complaint without leave to amend. Under the Federal
Rules such a dismissal must be regarded as a finding by the court that
the complaint, even if well pleaded, would not state a valid claim under
the Sherman Act.'" 4 The court clearly felt that the plaintiff would be
unable to show any "adverse effect or impact" on interstate commerce
arising from the defendant's conduct. 05
Thus, in most cases the plaintiff should be able to establish that
real estate brokerage is in interstate commerce, at least as carried on in
the more sophisticated marketing areas. However, in non-per se viola-
tion cases the plaintiff often will have a difficult burden to carry in
demonstrating that the brokers' activities in interstate commerce had
some adverse effect on that commerce. This problem of demonstrating
an adverse effect will be further developed in the discussion that fol-
lows on the affecting commerce doctrine.' 6
III. THE ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL BOARDS UNDER THE "AFFECTING
COMMERCE" THEORY
The fact that purely intrastate activities can be reached by the pro-
scriptions of the Sherman Act differentiates the Act from other federal
antitrust statutes." 7 "The jurisdictional reach [of the Sherman Act]
. . . is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate
flow of goods."' 1 8 '
Some courts have seized upon Goldfarb to support the view that
the activities of real estate brokers may substantially affect interstate
commerce. For example, in United States v. Greater Syracuse Board of
Realtors, Inc., 109 the court analogized the position of the defendant real
estate brokers to that of the attorneys in Goldfarb. "[I]n both cases, the
services of an attorney (Goldfarb) or a real estate broker (the present
case) are necessary for the movement of certain monies in interstate
104. Id. (Logan, C.J., concurring and dissenting). See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
105. [1978-1] Trade Cas. [ 62,079, at 74,688. The court also felt that the activities of the de-
fendants were purely local in nature. Id. As noted above, this view is difficult to support after
Goldfarb. See text accompanying notes 84-93 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 127-37 infra.
107. "The Sherman Act is commonly referred to as an 'effect' commerce statute, as opposed to
federal legislation such as the Clayton Act which operates upon actions and events which occur
'in' commerce." Eiger, supra note 15, at 282.
108. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) (emphasis added). "Con-
gress apparently wishes to emphasize the effect-on-commerce test, at least in another antitrust
area, because it recently extended the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission from matters
'in commerce' to matters 'in or affecting commerce.'" Furgeson, supra note 11, at 1068 (citing the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637,
§ 201, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46(a)(b), 52 (1970))).
109. 449 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). See note 83 supra.
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commerce.""1t 0 The court went on to say that the alleged price fixing
would, "to some extent," also affect the interstate movement of people
and federally guaranteed mortgages. "
One commentator has stated, "[t]he Court [in Goldfarb] ruled that
the interstate origin of the investment capital and the federal mortgage
guarantees placed the entire real estate purchase within the bounds of
the 'affecting commerce' doctrine." 2 If such be the case, then the doc-
trine is applicable to nearly every real estate board in the country." 3
Not every court has been willing to apply this interpretation of
Goldfarb to real estate brokerage, however. In McLain v. Real Estate
Board of New Orleans, Inc.," a price-fixing case, the court not only
refused to read Goldfarb as indicating that brokerage was in commerce,
but also refused to recognize any affecting commerce implications from
the case."t5 By contrast, the court in Greater Syracuse Board of Real-
tors, Inc. 116 sustained jurisdiction in a case where the government's ju-
risdictional averments did not include any allegations of interstate
mortgage funding or advertising.' The court felt that "the interstate
movement of a substantial amount of money in the form of referral
commissions and relocation service commissions [was]. . .particularly
significant in establishing a sufficiently substantial effect upon interstate
commerce . ,8 The McLain court had rejected this same argu-
ment. "19
The Syracuse case demonstrates that the quantity of interstate
commerce that the defendant's conduct has affected is crucial in deter-
mining whether or not the substantial effect test has been met. Courts
often go through a process of adding up effects in order to meet the test.
110. 449 F. Supp. at 896.
111. Id. However, the court felt that these latter factors, standing alone, would not show suffi-
cient nexus with interstate commerce to sustain jurisdiction.
112. Note, supra note 54, at 188-89.
113. As evidence of the pervasive use of federal loan programs, it is noted that of the total
mortgages outstanding in the United States in 1964, some 35% were government underwritten. S.
MAISEL, FINANCING REAL ESTATE 98 (1965).
114. 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed, 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), cer.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 2159 (1979). See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra.
115. For a discussion of the court's rather narrow basis for distinguishing Goldfarb, see note
83 supra and accompanying text.
116. 449 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
117. The government's allegations in support ofjurisdiction included only one of the Goldfarb
factors, that concerning government-insured loans. Other allegations referred to sales to residents
of other states and participation in national referral services. Id. at 894. No explanation was
given for the government's failure to allege the presence of interstate mortgage funding or adver-
tising. It seems likely that such allegations would have been available in a prosecution involving
an urban board.
118. Id. at 895.
119. 432 F. Supp. at 983 n.3.
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In Oglesby & Barclft, Inc. v. Metro MLS, Inc. ,120 a case in which juris-
diction was upheld under both tests, the court based its decision on the
fact that twenty-five to thirty percent of the financing obtained on
member brokers' sales was insured under the VA and FHA programs,
that "significant amounts" of mortgage loan sources came from out-of-
state, that members' sales were affected "to a significant degree" by re-
ferrals from national relocation services, that twenty to twenty-five per-
cent of the sales made by local brokers were to members of the armed
forces moving into or out of the state, and that members "advertised in
media circulated widely" outside the state.121
How much effect on interstate commerce must be demonstrated
before the effect will be deemed substantial can be determined only on
a case-by-case basis: 22
The concept of interstate commerce is an intensely practical concept
drawn from the normal and accepted course of business. Therefore,
the courts have eschewed the use of abstract mechanistic formulae in
determining whether a particular course of conduct substantially af-
fects interstate commerce.123
It would seem safe to say, nonetheless, that real estate board activi-
ties, especially in metropolitan areas, do sufficiently affect interstate
commerce so that they "cannot be classified as immune from all anti-
trust claims." ' 24 The real estate business in urban areas has become so
sophisticated that involvement in interstate commerce can hardly be
avoided. As the court in United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc. 125
noted: "This is not a case in which two real estate brokers in a small
rural community, who advertise only in a local newspaper, who do not
belong to any national or regional listing services, and who leave ar-
rangements of financing to lending institutions are charged with fixing
commission rates."'126
120. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 61,064 (E.D. Va.). See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
121. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 61,064, at 69,797.
An obvious preoccupation with quantity was also exhibited in United States v. Jack Foley
Realty, Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,678 (D. Md.). There, the government charged that six real
estate brokerage companies and three individuals had conspired to fix commission rates in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The court found that the defendant's activities had substantially affected
interstate commerce in that their combined real estate sales were "valued in the millions of dollars
during a twenty-two month period [and] . . .a substantial number of purchasers were persons
moving in or out. . .[of Maryland]." Id. at 72,790.
122. Confusing World 729.
123. Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817, 830 (W.D. Pa. 1975), a'd, 544 F.2d 1184 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
124, Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, [1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,079,
at 74,689 (10th Cir.) (Logan, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
125. [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,678, at 72,785 (D. Md.).
126. Id. at 72,791.
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However, merely establishing that a defendant's activities have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce will not suffice to carry the
plaintiff's jurisdictional burden. The plaintiff next faces the same hur-
dle that is presented in the in commerce situation. That is, he must
demonstrate that the complained-of activity adversely affects interstate
commerce. 27 It has been stated that the finding of this adverse impact
is "the focal point of the antitrust laws."' 28
Very few non-per se cases can be cited in which the plaintiff has
been able to sustain his burden of proof on the adverseness issue. In
Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors,29 the court held that a com-
plaint charging local board members with conspiring to segregate
neighborhoods by race stated a valid claim under the Sherman Act.
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on the nature of the adverse
impact on interstate commerce that it had unearthed. 3 0
The court in Brett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association13
offered considerably more guidance. In that case, a class of mortgagors
alleged that the defendant savings and loan associations had violated
the Sherman Act by conspiring to enforce illegal "due on sale" clauses
in deeds of trust and by requiring new purchasers to agree to renegoti-
ate interest rates on loans before existing mortgages could be assumed.
The district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.
The appellate court reversed, stating:
Although inadequately plead, plaintiffs . . . urge on this appeal at
least three adverse effects upon interstate commerce: (1) that inter-
state movement is unreasonably obstructed by agreements restricting
the transfer of equity in property; (2) that one or more of defendants
are subsidiaries of multi-state associations; and (3) that defendants'
activities affect rental costs of lessees who are only temporarily in the
state. 1
32
It is not clear whether the approach taken by the court in Brett has
any application to real estate brokerage, although it has been argued
that the exclusion of nonmembers from participating in a local board's
MLS program unduly restricts the housing market available to buyers
and sellers who choose to deal with nonmember brokers:
The "substantial effect" occurs either when buyers and sellers who
127. See note 18 supra and text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
128. Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236, 257.
129. 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967).
130. An adverse impact is, of course, necessary under either test. Cf. Cotillion Club, Inc. v.
Detroit Real Estate Bd., 303 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (without explicitly applying either
test, the court required a substantial effect on interstate commerce to invoke Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion). See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
131. 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972).
132. Id. at 1157.
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intend to cross state lines or have done so use nonmember brokers
and as a result are denied the opportunity to purchase property in a
market free of artificial imperfections, or when they use member bro-
kers and as a result are foreclosed from the greater sales services
available from nonmember brokers. 133
Under this analysis, the Sherman Act would be violated any time a
nonmember was unreasonably excluded from participation in a metro-
politan board's MLS. It is doubtful that most courts would accept that
position, although several consent decrees have approached such a
standard. 13 4
Exclusion from participation in the MLS is analogous to the impo-
sition of a boycott against the excluded broker, since in a practical
sense he will be precluded from dealing on a regular basis with mem-
ber brokers.'3  Boycotts are regarded as per se violations of the Sher-
man Act.' 36 Thus, under this analysis, an unreasonable exclusion from
participation in a board-run activity, like the MLS, might be consid-
ered a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Such a result fits well
within the ordinary application of antitrust policy to trade and profes-
sional associations. According to usual antitrust principles, "not only
must an association open its membership to all competitors in the cov-
ered industry, in many cases it must also make association services
available to competitors who are not members."' 37
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts generally have been reluctant to extend jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act to cover the activities of local real estate boards
and their members. It is urged in this Note that an understanding of
the nature of modem real estate brokerage and due regard for recent
developments in the case law would condemn this reluctance.
Real estate brokerage activities, at least as carried on in urban ar-
eas, should fall within the ambit of either the affecting commerce or the
in commerce test. The sale of real estate in urban areas has become so
133. Austin 1334.
134. At least two consent decrees have required that MLS membership be offered to all li-
censed brokers under nonarbitrary and reasonable membership requirements. See United States
v. MLS, [1972] Trade Cas. 1 74,221 (D. Ore.); United States v. Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc.,
[1972] Trade Cas. 74,068 (E.D.N.Y.).
135. Even if member brokers are in the habit of "cooperating" with nonmembers by allowing
them to sell their MLS-listed properties, the nonmember's denial of access to pertinent sales infor-
mation on the properties makes such cooperation largely meaningless.
136. M. MACARTHUR, AssoCIATIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 5 (1976). The analogy of-
fered here seems reasonable when the term boycott is defined as "nothing more than an agreement
by two or more parties. . . not to deal with a third party." Id. 6.
137. Id. 36-37.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
sophisticated that substantial interstate activity is essential to a success-
ful brokerage enterprise. Such brokers often rely upon interstate ad-
vertising and national relocation service affiliation to establish their
contacts with out-of-state buyers and sellers. Even in essentially rural
areas, a large percentage of sales made by local brokers involve feder-
ally insured and out-of-state mortgage funding. Any attempt to sepa-
rate the broker's purely marketing activities from his role in aiding the
purchaser in acquiring the necessary financing and insurance serves
only to ignore the local broker's full impact on the real estate sale. The
selling agent, through his role as "advisor" to the purchaser, often will
be as much a part of the financing transaction as the mortgage broker
or the lender.
Having established the necessary connections between the broker's
activities and interstate commerce, the plaintiff must deal with the more
fundamental problem of connecting the complained-of conduct with
some adverse impact on that commerce. The Supreme Court's decision
in Goldfarb left this latter requirement intact with regard to both of the
traditional tests.
This Note urges that the connection between the complained-of
activity and an adverse impact on commerce should be sufficiently es-
tablished any time the alleged misconduct involves either price fixing
or unreasonable exclusion from membership in the local real estate
board. Price fixing has long been regarded as a per se antitrust offense,
in which an adverse effect on commerce is presumed. Unreasonable
exclusion from board membership, at least in those cases in which such
membership is necessary for participation in the local Multiple Listing
Service, is tantamount to the imposition of a boycott against the ex-
cluded broker. Since such an exclusion restricts the real estate market
available to purchasers who choose to deal with the nonmember bro-
ker, the impact of the boycotting activity should be presumed. It is
toward such denials to the public of the benefits of free competition
that the Sherman Act is directed.
Reasons for the judicial refusal to extend Sherman Act jurisdiction
in the manner suggested in this Note range from the fear that federal
antitrust enforcement will become too pervasive 138 to the notion that
unnecessary preemption of state antitrust laws should be avoided. 39
However, if the sweep of the Sherman Act has indeed become too
138. See Dunfee, supra note 89, at 144 (fear of a "vastly expanded Antitrust Division or highly
selective enforcement-an inherently unjust option"); Furgeson, supra note 11, at 1053 n.8 (author
desires "some limit on the intrusiveness of Sherman Act regulation").
139. See Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (E.D.
Mich. 1969), aj'd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970).
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broad in our highly mobile society, then Congress, and not the courts,
should undertake to limit the Act's jurisdiction.
Happy Ray Perkins
